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Abstract 
The distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion has been well established in the Australian 
taxation system. However, for some time the Australian Government has ignored the difference between 
the two concepts when it comes to Australians using tax havens and being investigated as part of 'Project 
Wickenby'.1The Australian Government is deliberately labelling all attempts to minimise income tax 
through the use of tax havens and offshore financial centres (OFCs) as tax evasion and therefore a 
criminal act. There have been examples quoted in the press where the Australian Crime Commission, 
conducting investigations as part of 'Project Wickenby', have gained access to Swiss bank records on the 
basis that the Australian taxpayer has been involved in suspected tax fraud when this was not the case.2 
Is this one of the main reasons why the Australian Government is ignoring the distinction in order to 
detect money held in tax havens? This paper will examine the distinction between the two concepts and 
try to provide an answer for the approach being taken by the government. 
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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION 




 The distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion has been well established in 
the Australian taxation system. However, for some time the Australian Government 
has ignored the difference between the two concepts when it comes to Australians 
using tax havens and being investigated as part of ‘Project Wickenby’.1The Australian 
Government is deliberately labelling all attempts to minimise income tax through the 
use of tax havens and offshore financial centres (OFCs) as tax evasion and therefore 
a criminal act. There have been examples quoted in the press where the Australian 
Crime Commission, conducting investigations as part of ‘Project Wickenby’, have 
gained access to Swiss bank records on the basis that the Australian taxpayer has 
been involved in suspected tax fraud when this was not the case.2  Is this one of the 
main reasons why the Australian Government is ignoring the distinction in order to 
detect money held in tax havens? This paper will examine the distinction between the 






 The Australian statutory law as well as the common law recognises the important 
distinction between taxpayers engaging in conduct that constitutes tax avoidance and 
conduct that constitutes tax evasion. However, for some time the Australian 
Government has ignored the difference between the two concepts when it comes to 
Australians using tax havens and being investigated as part of ‘Project Wickenby’.3 
For example, the law to deter the promotion of tax schemes, Division 290, of the 
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ignores the distinction between tax avoidance 
and tax evasion and deals with ‘tax exploitation schemes’ instead. The Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act) is 
another example of the blurring of the distinction between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion because it allows government agencies to detect Australian taxpayers using 
tax havens by requiring their accountants, lawyers and financial advisers to report 
‘suspicious transactions’ that involve the transfer of money between tax havens and 
 
* LLB (Tas), MBA (Mon), LLM (Mon), Senior Lecturer, School of Commerce and Marketing, CQ 
University. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their time and effort in providing me 
with comprehensive feedback on the earlier edition of this paper. 
1 ‘Operation or Project Wickenby’ is the name given to a joint operation involving the Australian 
Crime Commission (ACC), the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC) investigating the use of tax havens by Australian taxpayers in what is 
alleged as criminal activity. 
2 Matthew Drummond, ‘Wickenby blunder taints tax inquiry’, Australian Financial Review, Sydney, 
22 March 2007, 1. 
3 ‘Operation or Project Wickenby’ is the name given to a joint operation involving the Australian 
Crime Commission (ACC), the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC) investigating the use of tax havens by Australian taxpayers in what is 
alleged as criminal activity. 
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Australia. These two examples of statutory law are clear examples of the Australian 
Government deliberately labelling all attempts to minimise income tax through the 
use of tax havens and offshore financial centres (OFCs) as tax evasion and therefore a 
criminal act. There have been examples quoted in the press where the Australian 
Crime Commission, conducting investigations as part of ‘Project Wickenby’, have 
gained access to Swiss bank records on the basis that the Australian taxpayer has been 
involved in suspected tax fraud when this was not the case.4  If tax minimisation can 
be held to constitute a criminal act then tax havens and OFCs can be encouraged to 
disclose bank account details of Australian taxpayers in that country. Is this one of the 
main reasons why the Australian Government is ignoring the distinction between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion in order to detect money held in tax havens? This paper 
will examine the distinction between the two concepts and try to provide an answer 
for the approach being taken by the government.  
 In 2004 Justin Dabner contended that the OECD’s campaign against ‘harmful tax 
competition’ was trying to ‘criminalise tax avoidance’ by attempting to group tax 
evasion and tax fraud with legitimate tax avoidance in order to achieve their outcome 
of deterring tax competition between countries, especially tax havens.5 For example, 
the law to deter the promotion of tax schemes, Division 290, Taxation Administration 
Act 1953 (Cth) ignores the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion and 
deals instead with ‘tax exploitation schemes’. The Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act) is another example of 
the blurring of the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion and this will be 
examined in detail later in the paper. It is contended that the Australian Government, 
the OECD6 and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)7 are deliberately labelling all 
attempts to legally minimise income tax through the use of tax havens and offshore 
financial centres (OFCs) as tax evasion and therefore a criminal act.  
 If all tax minimisation activity amounts to a criminal act then tax havens and the 
OFCs can be encouraged to disclose information on foreign investments in their 
country and justify breaching their own bank secrecy laws. All banks have strict laws 
that govern their ability to disclose information about their customers.8 However, in 
the case of criminal activity, information can be provided to foreign government 
agencies.9 Tax evasion constitutes the crime of fraud which in turn amounts to the act 
of ‘defrauding of the Commonwealth’. Hence, utilising the services of an OFC or a 
tax haven may also constitute the crime of money laundering. This would appear to be 
the reason why the Australian Government needs to blur the distinction between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion and therefore to be able to obtain banking details from 
 
4 Matthew Drummond, ‘Wickenby blunder taints tax inquiry’, Australian Financial Review, Sydney, 
22 March 2007, 1. 
5 Justin Dabner, ‘An update on the OECD’s harmful tax practices project’ (2004) 40 CCH Tax Week, 4. 
6 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998) OECD. 
7 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is located within the OECD in Paris but was established to 
actively prevent money laundering. 
8 It is not intended to discuss the law relating to the relationship between a bank and its customer other 
than to emphasise that both statutory law and common law provides strict codes of conduct in relation 
to the confidentiality of bank details. An excellent discussion of the importance of bank secrecy and the 
laws that try to ensure that customer information is kept confidential can be found in the OECD 
document, ‘Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes’ (2000) OECD, 19. 
9 OECD, ‘Financial centres become more transparent, but information exchange remains a problem for 
some’, 29 September 2008. The OECD acknowledged that in 78 of the 83 OECD and non-OECD 
economies, they now provide banking information in relation to requests involving criminal tax 
matters. Accessed www.oecd.org on 7 November 2008.  
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other countries on the basis that all tax minimisation activity amounts to criminal 
conduct, irrespective of whether it is ‘tax avoidance’ or ‘tax evasion’. 
 The paper commences with a discussion on the distinction between tax avoidance 
and tax evasion in Australia and then critically examines the current approach of the 
Australian Government to ignore the difference between the two concepts. It is argued 
in this paper that there has been a deliberate move by the Australian Government to 
treat tax avoidance as amounting to tax evasion and to ignore the legal distinction 
between the two activities. 
 
II THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH TO ‘TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX 
EVASION’ 
 
 It is generally acknowledged that tax evasion constitutes an act outside the law 
whereas tax avoidance is considered an act within the law. This basic principle of 
taxation law is supported by the definitions of tax avoidance and tax evasion 
contained in ‘The Taxation Review Committee’ Report, Australia 1975, which is 
commonly referred to as the ‘Asprey Committee Report’.10 According to I. G. 
Wallschutzky,11 the following definitions are based on those used in the ‘Carter 
Commission’ Report12 and the definitions contained in the UK ‘Radcliffe 
Commission’.13
The phrase ‘tax evasion’ describes an act in contravention of the law whereby a person who 
derives a taxable income either pays no tax or pays less tax than he would otherwise be bound 
to pay. Tax evasion includes the failure to make a return of taxable income or the failure to 
disclose in a return the true amount of income derived. …‘tax avoidance’, on the other hand, 
usually connotes an act within the law whereby income, which would otherwise be taxed at a 
rate applicable to the taxpayer who but for that act would have derived it is distributed to 
another person or between a number of other persons who do not provide a bona fide and fully 
adequate consideration; in the result the total tax payable in respect of that income is less than 
it would have been had no part of the income had been distributed and the whole been taxed as 
the income of that taxpayer.14
 
 The definitions of ‘tax evasion’ and ‘tax avoidance’, as quoted above, are no 
different from the definitions used in both Canada and the UK.  According to I.G. 
Wallschutzky, the [two types] of tax avoidance are within the law and are therefore 
different from instances of evasion which are outside the law.15 Not all commentators 
believe that the distinction is always clear. Professor Logue contends that the 
distinction is ‘notoriously fuzzy’, but reinforces the fact that tax evasion usually 
 
10 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘The Taxation Review Committee’, Australia 1975. The report can be 
found at the University of Sydney Library, accessed 17 November 2008. 
http://purl.library.usyd.edu.au/setis/id/p00087 
11 Wallschutzky, I. G., ‘Towards a Definition of the Term “Tax Avoidance”’ (1985) 14 Australian Tax 
Review 48, 52. 
12 The Royal Commission on Taxation, Canada 1966, commonly referred to as the ‘Carter 
Commission’. 
13 The Royal Commission on Taxation of Profits and Income, 1955, commonly referred to as the 
‘Radcliffe Commission’. 
14, Asprey, K. W. and Parsons, Ross, ‘Taxation Review Committee’ 1975, University of Sydney 
Library 2001, Chapter 11- Income Splitting, Paragraph 11.1, 215. 
15 Wallschutzky, I. G. n 9, 55. The reference to the two types of avoidance contained in the Asprey 
Committee’s Report are referring to types of tax avoidance intended to be covered by the legislature 
and those types of avoidance which are not covered by the legislature. 
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involves an ‘element of intentionality on the part of the taxpayer’.16 An example of 
this is provided by Professor Logue with a wealthy individual hiding income in a 
foreign bank account in a manner that is clearly not allowed by U.S. tax law. In that 
case the taxpayer is clearly a tax evader.17 Logue then suggests that tax avoidance 
could be simply defined as ‘arranging your affairs to minimise your taxes in a manner 
that is consistent with the law’.18  
 If the law relating to the distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance was that 
simple, and it is contended in this paper that it should be that simple, then the 
government has no basis for treating tax minimisation and tax avoidance as 
constituting tax evasion, and thus a criminal activity. The next step in the examination 
of this area of taxation law is to review the current statutory law in Australia. 
 
A Statutory Law Approach 
 
 In Australia the anti-avoidance measures are contained in a number of ‘General 
Anti-avoidance Rules’, GAARs. According to Professor Evans, these GAARs  are 
found in Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA 36), Section 
67 of the Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 (Cth) and Division 165 of the New 
Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth).19 Professor Evans discusses the 
‘shotgun and sniper’ approach to the specific statutory anti-avoidance provisions, 
SAARs, aimed at tax avoidance such as section 26-54 of the ITAA 97 relating to tax 
deductions incurred in criminal activities and section 86-10 of the ITAA 97 relating to 
preventing the alienation of personal services income through companies, partnerships 
or trusts.20 Evans contends that in Australia there is a ‘reliance on GAARs, SAARs 
and the promoter penalty regime, all bounded together in a carefully crafted risk 
management strategy’.21 The tax scheme promoter penalty regime will be critically 
examined later in this paper as an example of the blurring of the distinction between 
tax evasion and tax avoidance. However, it is important to note that the promoter 
penalty regime is seen as a major weapon being used by the government to combat tax 
avoidance in Australia. Similarly, the concept of a ‘risk based’ approach to managing 
tax avoidance will be discussed later in the paper under the heading of ‘other 
approaches to tax avoidance’, as many countries are using this system to try to 
overcome tax minimisation through abusive tax avoidance and tax mitigation 
schemes. 
 The statutory law does not provide a definition of what constitutes ‘tax evasion’ or 
‘tax avoidance’. A definition of tax avoidance is found in s 82KH(1) of the ITAA 36, 
but as Ian Wallschutzky states, it is only relevant for the sub-division in which it 
appears.22 In fact, the GAAR provisions contained in Part IVA, of the ITAA 36, do 
not provide a definition of what constitutes tax avoidance. At best, the provisions 
exhaustively define what is a ‘tax benefit’ pursuant to s 177C(1).  There is no mention 
of what might be considered to be acceptable tax avoidance or what is regarded as 
 
16 Logue, Kyle D, ‘Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance’ (2005-2006) 25 Virginia Tax 
Review, 339, 353. 
17 Ibid, 354. 
18 Ibid, 355. 
19 Evans, C, ‘The Battle Continues: Recent Australian Experience with Statutory Avoidance and 
Disclosure Rules’, in Judith Freeman (ed), Beyond Boundaries: Developing Approaches to Tax 
Avoidance and Tax Risk Management (2008) 37, 38. 
20 Ibid, 42. 
21 Ibid, 46. 
22 Wallschutzky, I, n 9, 49. 
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abusive tax avoidance. The GAAR provisions do not make any distinction at all. In 
the context of the Commissioner of Taxation being empowered to amend a taxpayers’ 
assessment of taxation, s 170(1) of the ITAA 36 provides that in the case of avoidance 
of tax due to fraud or evasion, there is no limit on the time in which the assessment 
can be amended. In the case of tax avoidance, the time limit is now four years from 
the date of the original assessment for the Commissioner to amend the assessment.23 
The section does not attempt to provide any type of definition of tax avoidance or tax 
evasion. In order to obtain an explanation of the type of activity that constitutes tax 
evasion or tax avoidance it is necessary to look to the common law in order to see 
how the courts in Australia have interpreted this area of the statutory law. 
 
B The Common Law Approach 
 
 The common law in Australia is regarded as being settled on the distinction 
between ‘tax avoidance and tax evasion’. In the case of R v Mears, 24 the NSW Court 
of Criminal Appeal, when considering an appeal against the severity of a sentence for 
an action pursuant to s 86A, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), conspiracy to defraud the 
Commonwealth, Gleeson CJ made the following statement on the distinction between 
tax avoidance and tax evasion: 
Although on occasion it suits people for argumentative purposes to blur the difference, or 
pretend that there is no difference, between tax avoidance and tax evasion, the difference 
between the two is simple and clear. Tax avoidance involves using or attempting to use lawful 
means to reduce tax obligations. Tax evasion involves using unlawful means to escape 
payment of tax. Tax avoidance is lawful and tax evasion is unlawful. Although some people 
may feel entitled to disregard the difference, no lawyer can treat it as unimportant or 
irrelevant. It is sometimes said that the difference is difficult to recognise in practice. I would 
suggest that in most cases there is a simple test that can be applied. If the parties to a scheme 
believe that its possibility of success is entirely dependent upon the authorities never finding 
out the true facts, it is likely to be a scheme of tax evasion, not tax avoidance.25   
 
 If the former Chief Justice of the High Court, Gleason CJ believes that the 
distinction is so important for lawyers and the courts, then why has the government 
been prepared to overlook this important distinction? A further example of the court 
considering the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion is found in Denver 
Chemical Manufacturing Co v DCT (NSW). The judgment of Dixon J provides an 
excellent description of the conduct required to constitute tax evasion by a taxpayer.  
I think it is unwise to attempt to define the word ‘evasion’. The context of s 210(2) [now s 
170(1), ITAA 36] shows that it means more than avoid and also more than a mere withholding 
of information or the furnishing of misleading information. It is probably safe to say that some 
blameworthy act or omission on the part of the taxpayer or those for whom he is responsible is 
contemplated. An intention to withhold information lest the Commissioner should consider the 
taxpayer liable to a greater extent than the taxpayer is prepared to concede, is conduct which if 
the result is to avoid tax would justify finding evasion.  
 
In the present case the Board concluded that the appellant intentionally omitted the income 
from the return and that there was no credible explanation before them why he did so. They 




23 Section 170(1)  Item  5 for tax evasion and Item 4 for tax avoidance. 
24 (1997) 37 ATR 321. 
25 Ibid, 323. 
26 (1949) 79 CLR 296, per Dixon J, 313. 
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 Dixon J agreed with the earlier finding of the NSW Court of Appeal in that the 
actions of the Appellant amounted to tax evasion. However, it should also be noted 
that the actions which might be regarded as constituting tax evasion and tax avoidance 
can arise in more situations than those involving the withholding of information or the 
provision of misleading information. Dealing in cash, as part of the ‘black 
economy’,27 to avoid paying tax on income is more than withholding information but 
still constitutes tax evasion. 
 In the recent case of Kajewski v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,28 the 
Commissioner of Taxation alleged tax avoidance through fraud and evasion. The 
taxpayer argued that the alleged fraud and evasion resulted from actions taken by their 
tax agent and that they were not aware of the situation that gave rise to the allegation. 
Section 170(2)(a), ITAA 36 [now s 170(1)] provides the Commissioner with the 
power to issue an amended assessment at any time if the avoidance of tax is due to 
fraud or evasion. The taxpayer also contended that ‘even if their original assessments 
were affected by fraud or evasion within s 170(2)(a), it was not fraud or evasion in 
which they personally engaged and that s 170(2)(a) did not therefore empower the 
Commissioner to issue the amended assessments in October 1999’.29 Drummond J 
made the following comment on the distinction between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion: 
There will be "an avoidance of tax" within this provision where, without any active or passive 
fault on the part of the taxpayer, less tax has been paid than ought to have been paid. See, eg, 
Australasian Jam Company Proprietary Limited v FCT (1953) 88 CLR 23 at 34; 10 ATD 217 
at 222. Fraud within s 170(2)(a) involves something in the nature of fraud at common law, i.e., 
the making of a statement to the Commissioner relevant to the taxpayer's liability to tax which 
the maker believes to be false or is recklessly careless whether it be true or false.30  
 
 Drummond J also quoted from the judgment by Dixon J in Denver Chemical 
Manufacturing Company v Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales), and 
confirmed that His Honour’s analysis was the most appropriate in determining the 
type of conduct that amounted to fraud or evasion on the part of a taxpayer. From the 
above limited examination of the common law, it can be seen that tax evasion can be 
clearly distinguished from tax avoidance and that tax evasion involves the taxpayer 
being engaged in conduct outside the law with an intention to not pay the required 
amount of tax by fraud or reckless behaviour. If the courts in Australia have no 
difficulty in distinguishing between tax evasion and tax avoidance, what then is the 
approach of other countries to this issue?   
 
C Other approaches to tax avoidance 
 
 One of the main criticisms of having a GAAR is that the legislature has a particular 
view of the type of conduct that may constitute tax avoidance on the part of the 
taxpayer. However, the judiciary does not always interpret and apply the law in the 
same way as was intended by Parliament.31 Tim Edgar explores this dilemma in his 
paper and strongly contends that it ‘is hopeless to leave it to the judiciary to articulate 
 
27 The term ‘black economy’ is commonly used in Australia to denote business conducted in cash in 
order to avoid any evidence of the receipt of income so as to avoid the payment of income tax or the 
Goods and Services Tax (GST) constitutes tax evasion. 
28 (2003) 52 ATR 455. 
29 Ibid, 483. 
30 Ibid, 484. 
31 Edgar, Tim, ‘Building a Better GAAR’ (2007-2008)  27 Virginia Tax Review 833, 837. 
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a behavioural prohibition that is neither under-inclusive nor over-inclusive in its 
identification of prohibited transactions’.32 He advocates the design of a GAAR by 
reference to a ‘business-purpose test’ with emphasis on the different concepts of the 
economic substance associated with the categories of tax avoidance behaviour, such 
as tax evasion, acceptable tax avoidance and abusive tax avoidance.33 By way of 
illustration, Edgar states that the Canadian GAAR has at its core, a distinction 
between ‘acceptable’ and ‘abusive’ tax avoidance and this is seen by some 
commentators as providing an ‘overly-broad category of acceptable tax avoidance and 
… an under-inclusive category of abusive tax avoidance’.34 Acceptable tax avoidance 
is sometimes referred to in the literature as ‘tax mitigation’ or ‘tax minimisation’ 
whereas abusive tax avoidance is seen as involving schemes that are ‘contrived’ or 
‘artificial’.35 The Australian GAAR does not provide that level of distinction and it is 
then left to the judiciary to determine those differences.  
 It could be argued that with the deliberate blurring of the distinction between tax 
evasion and tax avoidance in Australia that the Canadian approach may be seen as a 
desirable way of maintaining a distinction between acceptable tax avoidance and 
abusive tax avoidance. Acceptable tax avoidance is clearly seen to be within the law, 
whereas abusive tax avoidance, which may be outside the law, is properly treated as 
being similar to tax evasion.  
 Furthermore, the OECD in its ‘Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries’, has 
introduced the ‘notion of aggressive tax planning into the international tax lexicon’36 
and draws a distinction between acceptable tax avoidance such at tax mitigation and 
minimisation and aggressive tax planning involving sham transactions. The OECD 
study looks at the supply side of aggressive tax planning solutions, being provided by 
tax intermediaries such as accounting and law firms, and the taxpayers representing 
the demand side of the tax minimisation products.37 Aggressive tax planning is 
defined as: ‘planning involving a tax position that is tenable but has unintended and 
unexpected tax revenue consequences, and taking a tax position that is favourable to 
the taxpayer without openly disclosing that there is uncertainty whether significant 
matters in the tax return accord with the law’.38 It is contended that ‘the test of 
whether tax planning is “acceptable” should be what the legislation says as interpreted 
by the courts, and not what the tax authorities suppose it was intended to say’.39 This 
issue is highlighted in Part V under the heading of ‘Implications for the Rule of Law’. 
The approach taken by the OECD in their study into ‘tax intermediaries’ adds further 
weight to the argument that the current approach to tax mitigation and tax evasion in 
Australia, and internationally, is threatening the fundamental principle of the 
importance of the ‘rule of law’ in all legal systems throughout the world.   
 It is obvious that tax intermediaries have always created a problem for organisations 
such as the OECD and many countries with the promotion of tax havens and OFCs as 
a means of reducing the effect of taxation on multi-national corporations and high net 
worth individuals. As discussed below in this paper, the OECD has been deliberately 
 
32 Ibid, 837. 
33 Ibid, 837. 
34 Ibid, 878, 879 and footnote 100. 
35 Ibid, footnote 96, 878. 
36 Freedman, Judith, Loomer, Geoffrey and Vella, John, ‘Alternative Approaches to Tax Risk and Tax 
Avoidance: Analysis of a Face-to-Face Corporate Survey’ (2008) Working Paper 08/14, Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation, 2. 
37 OECD, ‘Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries’ (2008) OECD, 5. 
38 Ibid, 10. 
39 Freeman, Judith et al, n 32, 3. 
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blurring tax evasion and tax avoidance, but this current study  by the OECD would 
appear to put all activities used to mitigate tax within the category of ‘abusive tax 
avoidance’ and unlawful conduct, and therefore amounting to criminal tax activity. 
The OECD approach can be seen as another attempt to criminalise tax avoidance by 
creating an artificial distinction between tax mitigation, on the one hand, and 
aggressive tax planning, on the other hand, while all the time ignoring the clear cut 
distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance that has existed in the law of many 
of the OECD member countries based on the Anglo-US legal system.  
 One of the features of the OECD study into tax intermediaries is the discussion of 
the need for effective risk management by the tax authorities, and the OECD sees that 
as an important method to prevent tax avoidance by intermediaries. In fact, Australia 
and the UK40  have already adopted a risk-based approach to try to combat tax 
avoidance. As Anita Paddock and Chris Oates state, ‘[o]ne of the main drivers in the 
ATOs risk-profiling process is the perceived willingness of the corporate to use 
marketed tax mitigation in its tax planning programme’.41 If tax authorities engaged in 
cooperative discussions with corporations and high net worth individuals as part of a 
risk management program to encourage disclosure of tax mitigation arrangements, 
then there may not be a need to rely on the legislature, and the courts, to prevent tax 
avoidance after the event. In turn, this may alleviate the need to engage in the tactic of 
declaring all forms of tax minimisation as constituting criminal activity. 
 
III  THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
‘TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION’ 
 
 International bodies such as the OECD, the Financial Action Task Force, (FATF) 
and the Economic Union, (EU) have been actively involved in trying to limit harmful 
tax competition by tax havens and OFCs.  By grouping tax avoidance and tax evasion 
as constituting one and the same activity, the  international bodies such as the OECD, 
the Financial Action Task Force, FATF and the EU are able to make the presumption 
that any financial activity using an OFC or a tax haven must be tax evasion and 
therefore of a criminal nature. Branson QC 42 makes the observation that the OECD in 
its crusade against ‘harmful tax competition’ has ‘not sought to draw any clear or 
marked difference between evasion and avoidance and in every relevant respect they 
have been treated as one homogenous subject’.       
 The OECD report on harmful tax competition, paragraphs 53 and 54 43 do not 
attempt to clearly distinguish between tax avoidance and tax evasion when discussing 
the need for tax havens to become more transparent and to exchange information. In 
paragraph 53, the OECD makes the following comment: 
[B]ecause non-transparent administrative practices as well as an inability or unwillingness to 
provide information not only allow investors to avoid their taxes but also facilitate illegal 
activities, such as tax evasion and money laundering, these factors are particularly 
troublesome.44
 
40 The ‘Varney Review’ in the UK had advocated a risk-based approach to managing the tax risk 
associated with tax avoidance and large corporations. See the paper by Freeman, Judith et al, n 32 for a 
discussion on this issue.  
41 Paddock, Anita and Oates, Chris, ‘Corporate tax self-assessment lessons from down under’ (2003) 14 
International Tax Review 28, 29. 
42 Branson, C.C., ‘The international exchange of information on tax matters and the rights of taxpayers’ 
(2004) 33 Australian Taxation Review 71, 77. 
43 OECD, n 4, 23 and 24. 
44 Ibid, 23. 
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 In paragraph 54, the OECD then states that progress has been made in accessing 
information from tax havens through the entering of ‘mutual legal assistance treaties’ 
in criminal matters such as criminal tax fraud. According to Peter-Szerenyi, the issue 
of the exchange of information and transparency should only relate to criminal tax 
matters: 
The lack of exchange of information and transparency facilitates only illegal activity, not tax 
avoidance. Tax avoidance is legal, whether the home country knows about it or not. Thus, the 
tax authorities of the home country do not need any information for the correct and timely 
application of its own tax law. The lack of the two criteria (exchange of information and 
transparency) in connection with tax avoidance is a problem merely because it makes it 
difficult for the home country to detect and prevent the use of foreign tax regimes – in other 
words, to enact laws aimed at combating offshore investments (e.g. CFC rules), Paragraphs 70 
and 114.45
 
 In the OECD report46 on improving access to bank information it was stated that 
where ‘some countries rely heavily on a self-assessment system to administer their 
taxation laws…wilful failure of a taxpayer accurately to report income will generally 
be considered a criminal action.’47 In terms of requiring other countries to cooperate 
in providing access to information, the OECD Report goes on to make the following 
observation: 
With respect to assistance provided to other countries in criminal investigations (including 
criminal tax investigations), some countries generally apply the principle of ‘double 
incrimination’. That is, before assistance can be provided to a requesting country, it must be 
established that the conduct being investigated would constitute a crime under the laws of the 
requested country if it occurred in the requested country. In the tax area, application of this 
principle will not generally be an impediment to exchange of information for criminal 
purposes where the definitions of tax crimes are similar. However, where the definitions of tax 
crimes in the requesting and requested countries are markedly different, it may be impossible 
in many cases for the requesting country to obtain information that is vital to a criminal 
investigation.48
 
 In most tax havens tax avoidance is not a crime because as a result of those 
countries not imposing any form of income tax, there is no tax to avoid. However, the 
non-payment of income tax by an Australian resident taxpayer on income derived in 
an offshore bank account can be construed as constituting the act of ‘money 
laundering’ in Australia, because the proceeds are from a criminal act, namely tax 
evasion. In the tax havens that have introduced anti-money laundering legislation, tax 
related criminal activities would constitute a crime under their domestic law, 
particularly if the requesting country was able to argue that tax avoidance, in any 
form, was a crime and the subsequent laundering of the money through a tax haven 
constituting the crime of money laundering. For example, the Cook Islands introduced 
the Money Laundering Prevention Act in 2000 and amended its Crimes Act in order to 
introduce law based on the FATF 40 recommendations which are similar to the anti-
money laundering law in Australia.49 In that situation, the appropriate banking 
information about the Australian taxpayer may be supplied by the requested country. 
 
45 Peter-Szerenyi, Linda, ‘The OECD’s artificial approach to tax havens: Part 2’ (2003) 14 Journal of 
International Taxation 10, 20. 
46 OECD, Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes, 2000 OECD, 15, footnote 7. 
47 Ibid, 15, note 7. 
48 Ibid, 15, note 7. 
49 Financial Action Task Force/ OECD, 2005 Annual Report, 6. Accessed at www.fatf-gafi.org on 21 
November 2008. 
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This is one of the main reasons why the new AML/CTF Act has been introduced by 
the Australian Government. 
 The OECD has been successful in convincing Vanuatu, Samoa and Niue to enter 
into an agreement to exchange information on foreign investors using their offshore 
financial services. The countries entered into the agreements to exchange information 
on civil tax matters by 31 December 2005.50 Since that time, the OECD has been able 
to convince a further 83 OECD and non OECD countries to enter into ‘Double Tax 
Conventions’ for the exchange of banking information.51In the same OECD 
announcement, it is noted that Belgium has agreed to exchange banking information 
with the USA in relation to civil and criminal tax maters. This raises the issue of the 
need for countries such as Australia not only to develop relationships with other 
countries in order to enter into an agreement for the exchange of banking information, 
but also the need to classify tax maters as constituting a civil or criminal offence 
under the domestic law. It is not sufficient to merely classify all types of tax 
minimisation as constituting abusive tax avoidance and tax evasion on the basis that 
the investments are held in a tax haven. 
 When the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Alexander Downer was 
asked about his attitude to Vanuatu being a ‘tax haven’ and Australians using Vanuatu 
to avoid income tax, his answer was as follows: 
Well, I’m in favour of low tax and countries have got to make themselves as competitive as 
they possibly can in a competitive world, but what has worried us in the past has been on the 
issue particularly of money laundering. And the Vanuatu Government and Vanuatu Parliament 
has now legislated against money laundering and introduced this anti-money laundering 
legislation. We see that as a very good step forward but obviously it’s going to be a challenge 
to implement the provisions of the legislation and we’re happy to help the Government of 
Vanuatu in that respect.52
 
 This comment from the former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs would 
appear to condone Vanuatu as engaging in tax competition but at the same time taking 
measures to combat money laundering. It would be assumed that the Vanuatu law is 
designed to combat illegal tax evasion and not legitimate tax avoidance or 
minimisation. For the OECD or the Australian Government to impose sanctions as a 
result of tax avoidance in say Australia, while it is not contrary to the law in Vanuatu, 
would in fact be a breach of international law.53 To threaten another sovereign nation 
with sanctions or to terminate existing treaties just because they will not exchange 
banking information that may or may not be of a criminal nature is potentially a 
breach of obligations to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or a breach of Article 
54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.54 According to Benjamin 
Hartman, there is ‘no necessary connection between low taxes and tax evasion … 
therefore, no basis to claims that offering low taxes facilitates crimes’.55 He makes 
this claim on the basis that the tax havens are under no obligation to comply with the 
 
50 Linda Peter-Szerenyi, n 32, 18. 
51 OECD, ‘Financial centeres become more transparent, but information exchange remains a problem 
for some’, 29 September 2008.  
52 Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Alexander Downer, MP, Press Conference, Port Vila, 
Vanuatu, transcript 19 April 2006, accessed at: 
http:/www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2006/060419_vanuatu.html, on  22 September 2006. 
53 Linda Peter-Szerenyi, n 32, 23. 
54 Hartman, Benjamin, ‘Coercing Cooperation from Offshore Financial Centers: Identity and 
Coincidence of International Obligations Against Money Laundering and Harmful Tax Competition’ 
(2000-2001) 24 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 253, 264 
55 Ibid, 265. 
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directives issued by the OECD or FATF and non-compliance is not sufficient grounds 
to impose sanctions under international law.56
 The introduction of the so-called USA Patriot Act57 has not dramatically reduced 
the use of Caribbean tax havens by citizens of the USA.58 OECD and EU member 
countries still compete in trying to attract capital by reducing income tax rates. There 
is no ‘level playing field’59 in the world today and Australia has joined in the tax 
competition to attract wealthy individuals while ‘ring fencing’60 its own residents 
through the recently introduced tax law that applies to ‘temporary residents’.61 It will 
be interesting to see if the AML/CTF Act introduced into Australia will have a 
dramatic effect on tax havens. As Eden and Kudrle put it, ‘the jury is still out on 
whether the OECD’s attempt to name and shame tax havens as renegade states will be 
successful.’62 The same situation can be said of the following legislative attempts 
being introduced in Australia to prevent tax minimisation through OFCs and tax 
havens. 
 
IV  AN EXAMPLE OF BLURRING: THE LAW TO ‘DETER THE PROMOTION 
OF TAX SCHEMES’ 
 
The Australian Government introduced the law to deter the promotion of tax 
schemes, with effect from 6 April 2006. The provisions are designed to complement 
the GAAR.63  This law has the potential to deter the promotion of tax schemes such as 
those that involve the use of tax havens and OFCs, but it appears that it has 
deliberately ignored the difference between tax evasion, a criminal offence, and tax 
avoidance or tax mitigation, legal activity. 
 
A The law used to deter the promotion of tax schemes 
 
 The statutory provisions64 consist of three main parts, first the imposition of ‘civil 
penalties’ on ‘promoters’ of ‘tax exploitation schemes’ , second; ‘injunctions granted 
 
56 Ibid, 265. 
57 The term ‘USA Partiot Act’ is an anachronism for the Act called the ‘Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act’  
58 Lorraine Eden and Robert Kudrle, ‘Tax Havens: Renegade States in the International Tax Regime’, 
(2005) Law and Policy, 100, 123. 
59 The term ‘level playing field’ is taken from the OECD, ‘Tax Co-operation: Towards a level playing 
field (2006) OECD, 7. The OECD is determined to achieve a ‘level playing field’ in the areas of 
transparency and effective exchange of information for tax purposes, especially with civil and criminal 
tax matters. 
60 ‘Ring Fencing’ is the term used by the OECD, n 4,  to denote the existence of tax concessions for 
foreign investors that are not available to resident taxpayers. For example, temporary residents are not 
taxed on their foreign sourced income and are taxed as if on a ‘territorial’ basis.  In this case the 
Australian resident taxpayer is ‘fenced in’ and not able to take advantage of the same tax concession. 
61 The new law takes effect from 1 July 2006 and is now contained in Division 768, ITAA 97. The law 
started out as the Taxation Laws Amendment (2006 Measures No.1) Bill 2006 (Cth) and was enacted 
as Act No.32 of 2006. Section 768-900 provides that ‘this Subdivision modifies the general tax rules 
for people in Australia who are temporary residents, whether Australian residents or foreign residents. 
The term ‘ring fencing’ is used to denote tax law that favours non-residents over a countries own 
residents. In this case temporary residents do not pay income tax in Australia on income derived 
outside Australia.   
62 Lorraine Eden and Robert Kudrle, n 34, 124. 
63 Evans, C, n 19, 46. 
64 The new statutory law is found as Schedule 3, starting with Division 290, of TAA 53. 
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by the Federal Court’ to restrain an entity from engaging in promoting schemes, and 
third; ‘voluntary undertakings’ given by an entity not to continue promoting schemes. 
 
Sections 290-5 states that: the objects of this Division are: 
(a) to deter the promotion of tax avoidance schemes and tax evasion schemes; and 
(b) to deter the implementation of schemes that have been promoted on the basis of  
conformity with a product ruling in a way that is materially different from that 
described in the product ruling. 
 
 In the Explanatory Memorandum, the Government advises that the measures are 
designed to deter the promotion of tax avoidance and evasion schemes, collectively 
referred to as ‘tax exploitation schemes’ and to deter the implementation of schemes 
that have been promoted on the basis of a product ruling being provided by the ATO 
but the actual scheme is materially different from what was disclosed in the ruling.65 
The Government justifies the new law from an economic and social perspective on the 
basis that, by making the promoter of tax schemes at risk of financial loss in the same 
way that the investor is at risk, then this will deter the marketing of schemes and 
provide investors with protection from bad investments and therefore encourage more 
legitimate and productive investments.66 The promoter would be required to pay to an 
amount of money equivalent to the amount of tax, interest and penalties that is 
required to be paid by the taxpayer as a result of having entered into the scheme in the 
first place, if the scheme is found to have constituted tax avoidance or tax evasion. 
The money to be paid by the promoter is in the form of a civil penalty that can be 
imposed by the Federal Court up to a maximum of $550,000 for individuals, or $2.75 
million for a body corporate, and twice the consideration received as payment for 
selling the scheme. 
 The objective of providing investor protection is a very positive move on the part of 
the Government but it is also designed to support Part IVA, the tax avoidance 
measures, because of a perceived weakness in the current provisions. This issue was 
discussed by McCormack and Anderson on the basis that Part IVA may not extend to 
promoters of tax schemes in order for them to be penalised under those provisions.67 It 
would be usual for a promoter to obtain a fee or profit from the underlying scheme 
rather than a tax benefit. The only way to penalise the promoter was to introduce the 
‘promoter penalty’ regime. The ATO have recently released their practice statement, 
PS LA 2008/8 to provide guidance to their staff as to the application of the law to 
situations involving the promotion of tax schemes and in particular the role of the 
‘promoter penalty review panel’ that is responsible for administering the law.  
 
B Civil penalties, Promoter and Tax Exploitation Schemes 
 
 This area of the law gives rise to most of the perceived problems that may confront 
accountants, tax lawyers and financial advisers providing taxation advice to their 
clients. The concept of imposing a ‘civil penalty’ is similar to the range of remedies 
available to the Australian Securities and Investment Commission in situations where 
 
65 Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (2005 Measures No 6) Bill 2005, 4. 
66 Ibid, 59. 
67 McCormack J and Anderson D, Tax Schemes: “Unscrupulous promoters stand warned” (2004) 38 
Taxation in Australia, 27. The contention in the paper was that in the case of Vincent v FCT (2002) 51 
ATR 18, the Full Bench of the Federal Court was not prepared to hold that the promoter  engaged in 
the scheme in order to generate a tax benefit but rather to make a profit out of the companies associated 
with him.  
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it may be difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to satisfy a burden of proof ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ (as is the case in criminal proceedings), but it may be possible to 
satisfy a burden of proof of ‘balance of probabilities’, under civil proceedings. While 
it may be good law to impose civil penalties on those involved in insider trading, or 
breaching directors duties, it may not be the case with taxation law, where there is a 
reasonable argument that the conduct is within the law and does not amount to tax 
avoidance. This area of taxation law is still very vague and penalties may be imposed 
before a court has had an opportunity to rule on the legitimacy of the tax scheme. This 
situation could arise as it can take many years before a dispute as to whether or not a 
tax arrangement constitutes tax avoidance or tax evasion is determined by the High 
Court, but in the meantime the promoter has been required to pay civil penalties. 
 What is meant by the term ‘promoter’?  Section 290-60 provides the meaning of 
promoter as: 
(1) An entity is a promoter of a tax exploitation scheme if: 
(a) the entity markets the scheme or otherwise encourages the growth of the scheme 
 or interest in it; and 
(b) the entity or an associate of the entity receives (directly or indirectly) 
 consideration in respect of that marketing or encouragement; and 
(c) having regard to all relevant matters, it is reasonable to conclude that the entity  
  has had a substantial role in respect of that marketing or encouragement. 
 
(2) However, an entity is not a promoter of a tax exploitation scheme merely because the 
 entity provides advice about the scheme. 
 
(3) An employee is not to be taken to have had a substantial role in respect of that marketing  
or encouragement merely because the employee distributes information or material 
prepared by another entity. 
 
 What would be the situation for accountants, tax lawyers and financial advisers in a 
situation where their clients would like to utilise the services of an OFC in say, 
Singapore, in order to invest their savings more effectively? Simply locating 
investments in an OFC such as Singapore68 does not amount to tax avoidance or tax 
evasion and most accountants and taxation advisers would still believe that such an 
arrangement was legal. If the accountant or tax adviser in Australia provided advice or 
received a payment from the offshore finance centre does this make them a promoter? 
Clearly it can be seen that merely giving advice does not make that person or entity a 
promoter, but what is the situation if they received a commission related to the 
amount of money invested with the financial institution in Singapore, or encouraged 
their clients to enter into the arrangement, would they be caught by section 290-60 
and possibly face civil penalties?  
 One major criticism of the promoter penalty provisions contained in Division 290 is 
that while the Explanatory Memorandum does try to clarify the meaning of 
‘promoter’, section 290-60 fails in its attempt to provide any detailed clarification as 
to the extent of the conduct required to be held to be a ‘promoter’. For example, in the 
Explanatory Memorandum, the promoter needs to have a ‘substantial role’ in the 
promotion of the tax exploitation scheme and not merely provide advice. The concept 
 
68 Singapore is regarded by both Australia and the OECD as an offshore financial centre and has 
demonstrated a reluctance to cooperate on the disclosure of banking information unless it concerns 
their own tax law. The OECD media release dated 29 September 2008, titled, ‘Financial Centres 
become more transparent, but information exchange remains a problem for some’, states that there are 
‘significant restrictions on access to bank information for tax purposes … in Singapore.’ For more 
details see the OECD, ‘Tax Co-operation: Towards a level playing field’ (2006) OECD, 20. 
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of what is a ‘substantial role’ is to some extent discussed in the Explanatory 
Memorandum, but only mentioned once in s 290-60(1)(c), as seen above.69 The 
subsection 290-60(3) merely states that having a ‘substantial role’ requires more than 
the ‘marketing or encouragement through the distribution of information or material 
prepared by another entity’. It would have been very helpful if the section had 
provided greater guidance on this point so that accountants and advisers would be able 
to gain a greater understanding of their legal position when a client asks them for 
advice on investing money in, say, Singapore. The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), 
sections 15AA and 15AB, do provide for the judiciary to interpret provisions of the 
act by taking into account the objectives and the purpose of the government in 
enacting the  ‘promoter penalty regime’, and section 15AB also allows the court to 
take into account extraneous materials such as the explanatory memorandum.  
 The adviser may not be liable to the civil penalties if it can be shown that the 
arrangement was not a ‘tax exploitation scheme’, Section 290-65. In summary, the 
section provides the following meaning of tax exploitation scheme: 
 A scheme is a tax exploitation scheme if: 
 
(1) the scheme was implemented with the sole or dominant purpose of that entity or another 
entity obtaining a scheme benefit from the scheme; 
 
(2) if the scheme has been implemented and it is not reasonably arguable that the scheme 
benefit is available at law or would be available at law; 
 
 This then leads to the question, what is meant by the term ‘reasonably arguable’? 
The statutory provision covering this area of law is found in Schedule 1, s 284-15, of 
the TAA 53, in relation to the imposition of penalties for a shortfall in the payment of 
tax. The concept of what constitutes a ‘reasonably arguable’ position was considered 
judicially by the Federal Court in Prebble v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.70
 
C When is a matter ‘reasonably arguable’, Section 284-15 
 
 Section 284-15 (1) states that ‘a matter is ‘reasonably arguable’ if it would be 
concluded in the circumstances, having regard to relevant authorities, that what is 
argued for is about as likely to be correct as incorrect, or is more likely to be correct 
than incorrect.’  
Section 284-15 (2) states that to the extent that a matter involves an assumption about the way 
in which the Commissioner will exercise a discretion, the matter is only ‘reasonably arguable’ 
if, had the Commissioner exercised the discretion in the way assumed, a court would be about 
as likely as not to decide that the exercise of the discretion was in accordance with law.  
 
 In Prebble v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, the taxpayer, Dr Prebble was 
denied a deduction for a contribution made to a non-complying superannuation fund. 
However, even though the deduction had been denied, Cooper J held that as a result of 
advance opinions and rulings having being issued by the ATO to other taxpayers in 
earlier years, it was ‘reasonably arguable’ for him to take that position in preparing his 
tax return and therefore no understatement penalties should be imposed.71 It would be 
very difficult to predict whether this case and the existence of s 284-15 will provide 
comfort for advisers engaged in encouraging clients to implement a marketed tax 
mitigation arrangement?  It would be comforting for advisers to think that the Federal 
 
69 Explanatory Memorandum, n 60, 49. 
70 (2002) 51 ATR 459. 
71 Ibid, 470. 
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Court would find that they have not contravened Division 290, of the TAA 53, on the 
basis of a reasonably arguable position.   However, with all litigation it is not possible 
to predict the outcome, and they could be facing civil penalties as a promoter of a tax 
exploitation scheme. 
 
D No distinction between Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance: Overseas Experience 
 
 It is disappointing that the new law does not differentiate between tax evasion and 
tax avoidance. The new law simply lumps the two distinct activities into one, namely 
a ‘tax exploitation scheme’ and ignores the fact that tax evasion is illegal activity and 
prosecuted under the criminal law, whereas tax avoidance is legal but may be struck 
down by the courts under Part IVA. The law does not even consider making a 
distinction between acceptable tax avoidance and abusive tax avoidance, which 
appears to be the trend in other countries, as discussed above. The two activities, tax 
avoidance and tax evasion are clearly different and it illustrates the fact that the 
government is content to blur the distinction. In the USA, New Zealand and Canada, 
with their equivalent promoter penalty regimes, the distinction has been considered 
and given appropriate weight and the penalties imposed on promoters of tax shelter 
schemes are significantly less than those being considered in Australia.  
 According to McCormack and Anderson,72 Australia is not the first country to 
introduce a civil penalty regime to deter promoters of tax exploitation schemes. 
McCormack and Anderson discuss the situation in three countries, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the USA and the measures that have been introduced to deter the 
promotion of tax schemes. In New Zealand, the Government introduced measures 
designed to encourage the use of tax rulings issued by the Inland Revenue Department 
so that the Government can be alerted to new arrangements, in case the law has to be 
changed to prevent a loss of revenue. The term ‘arrangement’ is very broadly defined 
to include ‘any contract, agreement, plan or understanding’.73  The Australian 
equivalent, a ‘tax exploitation scheme’, has at its core the requirement that the entity 
has the ‘sole or dominant purpose of obtaining a scheme benefit’. In New Zealand, the 
law requires the tax arrangement to be offered, sold or promoted to at least 10 or more 
people in New Zealand before it is considered a scheme that is caught under the 
statutory provisions.74 The penalty that can be imposed is the amount of income tax 
shortfall from all participants in the arrangement. The New Zealand experience is 
similar to the Australian situation in that both governments are keen to see tax rulings 
obtained before tax planning arrangements are widely marketed to taxpayers. 
However, trying to obtain a private ruling in Australia requires time and money which 
runs counter to the whole concept of having a tax system based on self-assessment. 
 In Canada, the law to deter tax schemes was introduced on 29 June 2000 and was 
designed to catch schemes that ‘do not work and result in unwarranted claims for 
deductions’.75 According to McCormack and Anderson, the Canadian approach takes 
a narrow interpretation of the law so that the principles of ‘self-assessment’ are not 
undermined, in that all taxpayers are entitled to prepare their tax returns on the basis 
that they are correct in assessing their income and deductions, and that their position 
 
72 Ibid, 423. 
73 Ibid, 425. 
74 The new measures were made law on 26 March 2003 and are contained in the Tax Administration 
Act 1994 (NZ).  
75 Ibid, 425. 
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has merit, in the absence of any misleading or criminal conduct.76 The penalties in 
Canada are significantly less than those in Australia, namely the greater of $1,000 and 
100 per cent of the gross revenue gained from selling the tax shelter arrangement.  
 In the USA, tax shelter promoters are required to register their scheme with the 
Inland Revenue Service. The penalties are the greater of $1,000 and 20 per cent of the 
gross income derived from the arrangement. However, the IRS Internal Revenue 
Manual, Part 20, states that ‘a tax adviser would not be subject to the penalty for 
suggesting an aggressive but supportable filing position to a client even though that 
position was later rejected by the courts and even though the client was subjected to 
the substantial understatement penalty’.77  
 There is genuine concern that some taxation advisers may be caught by the law 
even when providing advice to their clients on marketed tax mitigation arrangements. 
There is a fine line between tax planning and tax avoidance, but in both cases there is 
no criminal conduct on the part of the adviser or taxpayer. It does not appear that the 
Government considered the experience in Canada and the USA, and in particular the 
penalty provisions, before enacting the new law.  
 One of the main concerns with the law is that many innovative lending and 
financial arrangements may not be promoted simply because the originators of the 
plans are hesitant to release the products for fear of being subject to very onerous civil 
penalties. Also of major concern is that the self-assessment system may be severely 
undermined as a result of taxation advisers being too frightened to be seen as 
‘promoters of tax exploitation schemes’ when preparing their clients’ tax returns and 
offering taxation advice. The Government may well have taken a ‘sledge hammer’ 
approach to a perceived problem and dressed it up as investor protection.  
Consequently it may have caused many taxpayers and accounting and law firms to be 
too frightened to take a position considered to be well within the law, but may 
subsequently be regarded as tax avoidance, therefore branding them as unscrupulous 
tax scheme ‘promoters’. In a situation where an accountant or lawyer is asked by their 
client to provide advice and to use their professional network to establish an 
investment fund with an offshore bank in, say, Singapore, what should they do? They 
will not be held to be engaging in the conduct of being a tax scheme promoter if the 
structure is not marketed to other clients of the firm or other professional practices. 
However, if that client fails to include any foreign income in their tax return each 
year, is the tax adviser then held to be a tax scheme promoter and guilty of a criminal 
offence? The tax adviser would be very wise to have extensive evidence that their 
client was made aware of their obligations to declare all foreign income and that 
criminal sanctions could be imposed, similar to those imposed on Glenn Wheatley,78 
and potentially other taxpayers targeted by ‘Operation Wickenby’.  
 
V A FURTHER EXAMPLE OF BLURRING:  THE AML/CTF ACT 
 
 The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) 
(AML/CTF Act)79 was introduced to overcome the inadequacies of the existing law 
 
76 Ibid, 426. 
77 Ibid, 426. 
78 Glenn Wheatley, a high profile Australian, was sentenced to gaol on 19 July 2007 for tax evasion as 
a result of using a tax haven to hide his investments. His actions were detected as part of the ‘Project 
Wickenby’ investigations. ATO, ‘Banking on you, our open door policy’, Speech by the Commissioner 
of Taxation, Australian Bankers’ Association Tax Workshop, Sydney, 22 August 2008.  
79 The AML/CTF Act 2006 received Royal Assent on 12 December 2006.  
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relating to the reporting of cash transactions and to require professional accounting, 
legal and financial advisory firms to report suspect transactions. The law has been 
implemented over a 24 months period to allow businesses to meet their obligations.80 
The first tranche has ‘covered the financial and gambling sectors, bullion dealers and 
lawyers/accountants, but only to the extent that they provide financial services in 
direct competition with the financial sector’.81 The second tranche then applied to real 
estate agents as well as accountants/lawyers carrying out certain transactions such as 
setting up a company in a foreign country. This means that accountants and lawyers 
will, from 12 December 2008, be required to report their clients if engaged in 
suspicious transactions such as transmitting money to a tax haven or OFC. On the face 
of it, such conduct would appear to constitute the act of money-laundering because 
the proceeds of that conduct would constitute the proceeds of a crime, in this case the 
crime being tax related. Even if the client was engaged in legitimate tax planning 
activity the transfer of funds to a tax haven would need to be reported to the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, (AUSTRAC).  
 The Replacement Explanatory Memorandum82 to the AML/CTF Bill states that the 
‘reforms are a major step in bringing Australia into line with international best 
practice to deter money laundering and terrorism financing that includes standards set 
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’83 and hence the reason for its proposed 
enactment. Prior to the AML/CTF Act, under the Financial Transactions Reports Act 
1988 (Cth) cash dealers were required to report suspect transactions involving 
$10,000 or more in cash or international funds transfers, and the opening of bank 
accounts in Australia. The statutory law in existence prior to 2006 was not considered 
by the Government to be adequate, especially with the increase in non face to face 
transactions through electronic transfers. Instead, the AML/CTF Act adopts a ‘risk 
based approach’ to identifying customers that may be engaged in money laundering or 
terrorism financing and applies to a very wide range of businesses, not just cash 
dealers. The use of tax havens and schemes devised by lawyers and accountants is 
now part of the focus of the new law and will be comprehensively dealt with in the 
second tranche of law.  
 
A What is ‘money laundering’? 
 
 Much is made of the conduct known as ‘money laundering’, but very little attention 
is paid to defining exactly what are the essential ingredients in the act of engaging in 
‘money laundering’. In the ‘Issues Paper 1, Financial Services Sector’ released as part 
of the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department paper on the Anti-Money 
Laundering Reform, an attempt was made to describe ‘What is money laundering?’84 
‘The goal of most criminals is to generate a profit. To enjoy their ill-gotten gains, 
criminals commonly seek to disguise the illegal source of those profits. Money 
laundering is the processing of criminal profits to disguise their illegal origin.’ 
 
80 The obligations under the Act require (1) customer identification and verification within 12 months 
from 12 December 2006; (2) record keeping – in various stages within the 12 months; (3) establishing 
and maintaining an AML/CTF program – within 12 months; (4) ongoing customer due diligence and 
reporting suspicious matters, international funds transfers – 24 months after 12 December 2006. 
81 Replacement Explanatory Memorandum to the AML/CTF Bill at page 1.   
82 The new law was released to the public for comment as an ‘exposure draft’ and the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Bill was eventually introduced to the Commonwealth 
Parliament on 1 November 2006 after taking into account submissions by interested parties.  
83 Replacement Explanatory Memorandum, n 30, 1. 
84 Issues Paper 1, Financial Services Sector, 1. 
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In the Australian Law Reform Commission Report 8785 on the Proceeds of Crime 
and in particular Part 7, Laundering of Property and Money, the report attempts to 
define money laundering as follows: 
The definitions of money laundering most frequently used in domestic legislative provisions is 
derived from that used in the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 86 which provides that money laundering is: 
• the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived 
from any indictable offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person, who is 
involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal 
consequences of his or her actions or  
• the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from an indictable offence or offences or from an act of 
participation in such an offence or offences. 87  
 
 Similarly, in the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, money laundering is defined as follows 
a. the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is proceeds, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person 
who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of 
his actions;  
 
b. the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, 
rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is proceeds. 88  
 
 This means that tax evasion, which constitutes the criminal offence of ‘defrauding 
the Commonwealth’, which is in the Commonwealth Criminal Code,89 could amount 
to money laundering if an OFC or a tax haven was used to disguise or conceal income 
from investments that were not subsequently declared in the Australian taxpayers tax 
return.  The offence of money laundering is contained in Part 10.2, Division 400 of 
the Criminal Code. The Replacement Explanatory Memorandum to the AML/CTF 
Bill provides the following estimate of the extent the financial problem faced by the 
Government in terms of money that is being laundered every year and not being 
subject to income tax in Australia. 
The size of the money laundering problem cannot be accurately quantified but, in a research 
project funded by AUSTRAC and drawing on a wide range of financial and other data relating 
to 1994, it was estimated that in that year `a range of between $1, 000 million and $4,500 
million would appear to be a sensible interpretation of the information provided in these sets 
of estimates, with perhaps some confidence that the most likely figure is around $3,500 






85 ALRC Report 87: Proceeds of crime, <www.alrc.gov.au> 2 January 2007.  
86 Although that was restricted to narcotics related offences. 
87 Australian Treaty Series 1993 No 4 UNTS art 3(1)(b).  
88 ETS No 141 art 6. 
89 The offence of defrauding the Commonwealth was until 2005 contained in the Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth), s 29D.  
90 J Walker Estimates Of The Extent of Money Laundering In And Through Australia AUSTRAC 
September 1995, 39. This report is also referred to in the Replacement Explanatory Memorandum to 
the AML/CTF Bill at page 12 to justify the introduction of the law.  
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B  Designated services – Lawyers, accountants and financial advisers 
 
 The concept of requiring businesses engaged in providing ‘designated services’ to 
report suspect customers and obtaining proof of identification are the key measures 
being used by the law to detect suspicious matters. The definition of ‘designated 
services’ is so broad, that it will cover all businesses which provide trade credit, 
including all consumer credit transactions. There is also no limit on the money being 
paid for a designated service, except a $1000 limit for stored value cards.  
 The Act generally requires a business to ‘identify’ new customers before providing 
a service.  Circumstances in which a customer can be identified after the service has 
been provided are if the prior identification would disrupt the ordinary course of 
business, the service is specified in the AML/CFT Rules, and: 
– It is not provided face-to-face; or 
– It consists of acquiring or disposing of a security or derivative on 
 behalf of a customer; or 
– It consists of issuing or undertaking liability as the insurer under a 
   life 
 policy or a sinking fund policy. 
– In some circumstances, the provision of certain low-risk services 
will 
not require client identification. 
 The AML/CTF Rules are made by AUSTRAC pursuant to powers provided by s 
229 of the AML/CTF Act and to date a number of rules have been made.91  
 Lawyers, accountants and financial advisers are only under an obligation to report 
suspicious matters when providing ‘designated services’. Section 6 of the Act 
contains two tables.  The first lists 63 designated services of a financial services 
nature with specific reference to Australian Financial Services License holders ( Items 
62 and 63 refer to buying and selling bullion). The second table refers to gambling 
services. Therefore lawyers, accountants and financial advisers are a reporting entity 
to the extent that they provide designated services. 
 For example, lawyers acquiring or disposing of securities on behalf of clients, 
creating and dealing with promissory notes, bills of exchange, and arranging safe 
deposit box facilities are providing a designated service. Preparing a will is not a 
designated service. However, the purchase of real property and the provision of 
mortgage finance or international transfer of funds is a designated service because the 
transfer of real property and mortgage arrangements can be used to launder money.92 
Similarly, the creation of a trust or company structure to be used to move funds 
offshore or on shore will be a designated service. The following services are not 
regarded as being ‘designated services’: 
• Preparation of a tax return is not a designated service. 
• Providing advice on what are securities and derivatives. 
• Establishing a superannuation fund and then advising on the investment of  
the funds. 
• Advising on life insurance or a sinking fund insurance policy. 
 
 
91For more details see  AUSTRAC, www.austrac.gov.au/aml_ctf_rules.html, accessed 21 November 
2008 
92 AML/CTF Bill, Issues Paper 5 – Legal Practitioners – Accountants – Company and Trust Service 
Providers, 5.  
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 The main thrust of the AML/CTF Act is to require businesses which provide 
designated financial services to have a process to identify their customers. 
Professional advisers are referred to as ‘gatekeepers’ in the Explanatory 
Memorandum because of those people involved in money laundering using the 
services of professionals to launder the money. The Government has recognised that 
criminals use sophisticated structures such as trusts, companies and managed 
investment schemes to launder money. However, what happens when an existing 
client seeks advice from their lawyer or accountant about establishing an investment 
fund in say, Singapore, because they want to diversify their investments. Would their 
accountant or lawyer have to report this activity or be in breach of their obligations 
under the AML/CTF compliance requirements, or do they make the judgment that the 
activity is legal and does not amount to money laundering? The simple answer is that 
they must report those transactions to AUSTRAC or face serious consequences.  
 The AML/CTF Act requires professional practices, whether they are engaged in 
accounting, legal or financial planning services, to not only formally identify their 
clients but also to report their activities to AUSTRAC that may be suspicious in terms 
of money laundering or terrorist financing. As was mentioned above, the government 
is aware that these types of professional practices provide services to those people 
engaged in money laundering and they want to identify those involved so that they 
can be prosecuted. Unfortunately, taxpayers engaged in tax planning activities may be 
caught by this new law as it makes no distinction between tax evasion, tax avoidance 
or tax planning. Clearly, the government would like to see all tax minimisation 
activity categorised as constituting a criminal offence and then the taxpayer can be 
prosecuted under the Commonwealth Criminal Code for money laundering. 
 
C International implications of the Law 
 
 Designated services are not subject to the new law unless the service is provided in 
Australia through a ‘permanent establishment’ of a Foreign Service provider, or the 
service is provided by an Australian resident or a resident subsidiary company 
through a permanent establishment in a foreign country. Will this law result in 
Australians obtaining financial and taxation advice from a non-Australian provider in 
a location outside Australia? This may well be the case and the government will be in 
an even more difficult situation in trying to detect Australian taxpayers engaged in tax 
planning activities in tax havens and OFCs. Similarly, will Australians be reluctant to 
obtain tax planning advice in Australia even if not engaged in money laundering, but 
legal tax mitigation using a tax haven or OFC? In particular, what effect will this law 
have on Australians using tax havens for legal purposes? Given that Australian Banks, 
Australian accounting firms and Australian law firms have offices in tax havens in the 
Asia-Pacific region their services are subject to the  AML/CTF Act where they are 
operating through a permanent establishment in that country. These questions will not 
be answered for a number of years and should provide a fertile area for future 
research. Indeed, as Eden and Kudrle noted regarding the future of tax havens in light 
of initiatives by the OECD and now Australia, with the proposed anti-money 
laundering legislation, at this stage no research has been undertaken into the role of 
the multinational enterprises and international tax and accounting firms located in tax 
havens.93   
VI IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ‘RULE OF LAW’ 
 
93 Lorraine Eden and Robert Kudrle, n 52, 124.  
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 One of the major implications of the government treating all tax minimisation 
activity, either by tax avoidance or tax evasion, as constituting criminal activity, is 
that it threatens the ‘rule of law’.  By ignoring clear distinctions within the established 
taxation law of Australia on this point, it provides the ATO with powers that 
potentially infringe the rights of taxpayers. More importantly, by confusing the issue 
of what constitutes acceptable tax mitigation activity with unacceptable tax avoidance, 
the rule of law is put at risk by the inherent complexity of the current law. 
 The ‘Rule of Law’ is a principle contained in the English legal system and as 
enunciated by Professor Dicey, holds that all men are equal under the law except the 
Crown.94 It can also be expressed as the notion ‘that the people and the government 
should obey the law and be ruled by it’, but the legal concept of the ‘rule of law’ is 
not readily definable.95 What is important in this context is the fact that there is a 
‘strong correlation between economic growth and a strong rule of law…’96  In other 
words; a country that ensures that all of its citizens and the government obey the law 
will have a strong and vibrant economy. If that is the case then the law must be easy 
to understand and administered fairly, and the doctrine of separation of powers should 
also operate effectively. Parliament, consisting of elected representatives, makes the 
law; the Executive administers the law and the Judiciary resolves any disputes arising 
from interpreting the law. In the context of a deliberate blurring of the distinction 
between tax avoidance and tax evasion, the rule of law has relevance because of how 
the existing law is to be made and interpreted by Parliament, the Executive and 
administrators, and the Judiciary. Professor Walker is of the opinion that the rule of 
law is being eroded due to the number of wide discretions, especially in relation to tax 
avoidance, Part IVA, and provides the following statement to that effect: 
The ultimate grant of discretionary power is, of course, Part IVA, enacted in 1981 and to 
which the rest of the Act is subject. Australia has placed more reliance on the GAAR than any 
other Western democracy, and Part IVA’s supporters argue that it may strengthen the rule of 
law by increasing compliance with tax legislation. The problem, however, is that it seeks to 
encourage compliance by means that compromise the rule of law, for example by depending 
on discretion and opinion.97
 
 Professor Walker contends that there is far too much discretion given to both the 
ATO and the courts in determining what constitutes tax avoidance. He quotes 
extensively from Professor Jeffrey Waincymer in that ‘this approach offends against 
the separation of powers doctrine and the requirement that the laws be made by 
parliament not bureaucrats’.98  
 One of the key issues that Professor Walker has identified as being conducive to an 
erosion of the rule of law is found in the ATO’s ruling system where in ‘perhaps 90 
percent of cases these materials are consistent with enacted law, but in the remainder 
 
94 Woodley, Mick (ed), Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary (10th ed, 2005) 359.  
95 Buckley, Ross, (ed) Overseas Law, The Rule of Law and Economic Vibrancy (2003) 77 Australian 
Law Journal 424, 424. 
96 Ibid, 425. Ross Buckely has taken this quote from Douglas North, the Nobel Prize winner in 
Economics in 1993 who researched the correlation between the rule of law and economic growth and 
development. 
97 Walker, Geoffrey de Q, ‘The Tax Wilderness – How to Restore the Rule of Law’ (2004) CIS Policy 
Monograph 60, The Centre for Independent Studies, 3. 
98 Ibid, 3. The reference to Professor Waincymer is taken from Waincymer, Jeffrey, ‘The Australian 
Tax Avoidance Experience and Responses: A Critical Review’, in Cooper, Tax Avoidance and the Rule 
of Law, 247. 
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the ATO is effectively making its own rules’.99 In 1992, when the ruling system was 
being introduced into Parliament by the Minister assisting the Treasurer, it was stated 
that ‘the ruling system was touted as promoting certainty for taxpayers and thereby 
reduce their risk and opportunity cost’.100 However, a recent example of where an 
ATO ruling, TR 1999/5 was in conflict with the case law is found in the Federal Court 
decision in Essenbourne Pty Ltd v FCT.101  The ruling was subsequently withdrawn 
on 27 June 2007 after the Commissioner of Taxation had publicly disagreed with the 
decision of Kiefel J through an ATO Media release102 and the Commissioner had 
brought three more cases before the Federal Court in an attempt to obtain a Federal 
Court decision in line with its public ruling, TR 1999/5. In the end, all of the Federal 
Court decisions103 held that there was no fringe benefit in the situation involving 
employee benefit trusts and non-complying superannuation funds. The major issue 
threatening the ‘rule of law’ in this situation was that the Commissioner of Taxation 
was adopting the position of the Parliament and the Judiciary in making new taxation 
law in relation to the fringe benefits tax. The stance taken by the ATO went far 
beyond what is required to administer the taxation law and would have added to the 
confusion facing tax professionals, business and individual taxpayers.  
 Professor Walker provides a number of examples of situations where the discretion 
provided to the Commissioner of Taxation has led to the ATO adopting the role of 
law maker and as such threatening the rule of law.104 One example that has serious 
implications for tax administration is the bonus arrangement that auditors are being 
paid for every extra dollar of revenue collected. As Professor Walker states, ‘the 
practice of remunerating tax officers according to the amount of revenue they collect 





 The distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion, that has been firmly 
established in the Australian common law, is still of great importance when dealing 
with taxation issues domestically. However, it would appear that the Australian 
Government is determined to ignore the distinction between tax avoidance, a legal 
activity and tax evasion, a criminal activity, when it comes to Australian taxpayers 
engaging in tax planning in a tax haven or through the use of an OFC. The 
Government has recognised that many tax schemes involve the use of tax havens, and 
appear to have designed a set of laws to deter the promotion of tax schemes that make 
no distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Similarly, in relation to the law 
to detect and eliminate money laundering, once again the Government appears to have 
deliberately blurred the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion. The 
AML/CTF Act would appear to designate that all measures to reduce and minimise 
income tax through the use of tax havens constitutes criminal activity and therefore 
 
99 Ibid, 2. 
100 Wallis, David, ‘The tax complexity crisis’ (2006) 35 Australian Tax Review 274, 283. 
101 (2002) 51 ATR 629. 
102 Australian Taxation Office, Media Release National 03/30 (2003). 
103 The cases before the Federal Court that held that there was no fringe benefit in terms of the ruling 
TR 1999/5 were Walstern Pty Ltd v FCT (2003) 138 FCR 1, Caelli Constructions (Vic) Pty Ltd v FCT 
(2005) 147 FCR 449, and Indooroopilly Children Services (Qld) Pty Ltd v FCT [2007] FCAFC 16. 
104 Walker, Geoffrey, n 96, 3-5.  
105 Ibid, 5. 
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justifies the tax haven in breaching its bank secrecy laws. The fact that the rights of 
the taxpayer may be adversely affected and the taxpayer wrongly being accused of 
criminal activity is of no concern for the Government when trying to maximise 
government revenue.  
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